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**Time is of the essence: impact of delays on effectiveness of contact tracing
for COVID-19**

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31 Summary

32 Background

33 With confirmed cases of COVID-19 declining in many countries, lockdown measures are
34 gradually being lifted. However, even if most social distancing measures are continued,
35 other public health measures will be needed to control the epidemic. Contact tracing either
36 via conventional methods or via mobile app technology is central to control strategies
37 during de-escalation of social distancing. It is therefore essential to identify key factors for a
38 contact tracing strategy (CTS) to be successful.

39

40 Methods

41 We evaluated the impact of timeliness and completeness in various steps of a CTS using a
42 stochastic mathematical model with explicit time delays between time of infection,
43 symptom onset, diagnosis by testing, and isolation. The model also includes tracing of close
44 contacts (e.g. household members) and casual contacts with different delays and coverages.
45 We computed effective reproduction numbers of a CTS (R_{cts}) for a population with social
46 distancing measures and various scenarios for isolation of index cases and tracing and
47 quarantine of its contacts.

48

49 Findings

50 In the best-case scenario (testing and tracing delays of 0 days and tracing coverage of 100%)
51 the effective reproduction number will be reduced with 50% from 1.2 (with social distancing
52 only) to 0.6 (R_{cts}) by contact tracing. A testing delay of 3 days requires tracing delay or

53 coverage to be at most 1 day or at least 80% to keep R_{cts} below 1, with the R_{cts} reduction
54 being 15% and 17%, respectively. With a testing delay of 4 days, even the most efficient CTS
55 cannot reach R_{cts} values below 1. The effect of minimizing tracing delay (e.g., with app-
56 based technology) declines with declining coverage of app use, but app-based tracing
57 remains more effective than conventional contact tracing even with 20% coverage. The
58 proportion of transmissions per index case that can be prevented depending on testing and
59 tracing delay and isolation of index cases ranges from above 80% in the best-case scenario
60 (testing and tracing delays of 0 days) to 40% and 17% with testing delays of 3 and 5 days,
61 respectively.

62

63 **Interpretation**

64 Minimizing testing delay is of key importance for the effectiveness of CTS. Optimizing testing
65 and tracing coverage and minimizing tracing delays, for instance with app-based technology
66 further enhances effectiveness of CTS, with a potential to prevent up to 80% of all
67 transmissions. The process of conventional contact tracing should be reviewed and
68 streamlined, while mobile app technology may offer a tool for gaining speed in the process.

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73 **Funding:** ZonMw project number 91216062

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76 **Research in context**

77 **Evidence before this study**

78 As of 8 May 2020, the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has spread globally and has caused
79 more than 263,000 confirmed deaths of COVID-19 worldwide. In the absence of effective
80 medicines and vaccines, many countries have implemented strict measures of social
81 distancing, thereby reducing transmission and bringing the epidemic under control. For
82 lifting these measures, adequate tools are needed to deal with possible newly arising
83 transmission clusters. Strategies including isolation of confirmed and suspected cases, and
84 identification and quarantining of their contacts are considered a key part of the response
85 during de-escalation of social distancing. As a substantial portion of transmission may occur
86 before the onset of symptoms and before cases can be isolated, it is unclear how successful
87 contact tracing strategies (CTS) can be in reducing onward transmission.

88

89 **Added value of this study**

90 We performed a systematic analysis of the various steps required in the process of testing
91 and diagnosing an index case as well as tracing and isolation possible secondary cases of the
92 index case. We then used a stochastic transmission model which makes a distinction
93 between close contacts (e.g. household members) and casual contacts to assess which steps
94 and (possible) delays are crucial in determining the effectiveness of CTS. We
95 evaluated how delays and the level of contact tracing coverage influence the effective
96 reproduction number, and how fast CTS needs to be to keep the reproduction number
97 below 1. We also analyzed what proportion of onward transmission can be prevented for
98 short delays and high contact tracing coverage. Assuming that around 40% of transmission

99 occurs before symptom onset, we found that keeping the time between symptom onset and
100 isolation of an index case short (<3 days) is imperative for a successful CTS. This implies that
101 the process leading from symptom onset to receiving a positive test should be minimized by
102 providing sufficient and easily accessible testing facilities. In addition, reducing contact-
103 tracing delays also helps to keep the reproduction number below 1.

104

105 **Implications of all the available evidence**

106 Our analyses highlight that CTS will only contribute to containment of COVID-19 if it can be
107 organised in a way that time delays in the process from symptom onset to isolation of the
108 index case and his/her contacts are very short. The process of conventional contact tracing
109 should be reviewed and streamlined, while mobile app technology may offer a tool for
110 gaining speed in the process.

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112 Introduction

113 As the first wave of the SARS-CoV-2 has reached its peak of cases in many countries,
114 societies are preparing so-called exit-strategies from the COVID-19 lockdown, while still
115 successfully controlling transmission. Contact tracing, in combination with testing and
116 quarantine or isolation of the contacts, is considered a key component in a phase when
117 lockdown measures are gradually lifted¹⁻⁸ This requires upscaling of conventional contact
118 tracing capacity. The potential of mobile apps to support contact tracing is widely discussed
119 and such technology has been used in several Asian countries that have successfully reduced
120 case numbers⁹⁻¹⁴. Yet, many uncertainties remain on the optimal process of contact tracing
121 with conventional methods and/or mobile applications, on the timing of testing for current or
122 past infection, and on the required coverage of contact tracing needed. As a result, predicting
123 the effects of contact tracing, and predicting whether and at which level of virus circulation
124 contact tracing can sufficiently control remaining transmission is difficult.

125

126 Modelling studies have demonstrated how mobile applications can increase effectiveness of
127 contact tracing, compared to conventional approaches for contact tracing, but effectiveness
128 depends on what proportion of the population will use the app consistently and for a
129 sufficiently long period of time⁹.

130

131 In previous work, we have investigated the impact of timeliness and completeness of case
132 reporting for the effectiveness of surveillance and interventions¹⁵⁻¹⁷, and we quantified the
133 timeliness of contact tracing of infected passengers during an airline flight for the 2009
134 pandemic influenza¹⁸. In all of these studies, the timing of various steps in the monitoring and
135 intervention chain emerged as one of the key factors for effectiveness of a public health

136 response. Usually, there are identifiable delays in the response chain that may be critical to
137 the overall effectiveness of a strategy.

138

139 Here we analyze in detail the process chain of identifying index cases by symptom-reporting
140 followed by testing, and subsequent contact tracing, with the aim to inform policy makers on
141 the relative importance of key steps in the process. We use a mathematical model that reflects
142 the various steps and delays in the test and contact tracing process to quantify the impact of
143 delays on the effective reproduction number and the fraction of onward transmission
144 prevented per diagnosed index case^{5,19}.

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147 Time delays in contact tracing

148 Our starting point is an assumed effective reproduction number (R_e) for COVID-19 of around
149 1, describing a situation with “social distancing but measures lifted to some extent”. We then
150 quantify the relative contribution of the individual components of a contact trace strategy
151 (CTS) required to bring and maintain the effective reproduction number with CTS (R_{CTS}) to a
152 value below 1. For simplicity we do not include transmission in healthcare settings.

153 We break down the process of contact tracing in two different steps (Table 1 and Figure 1).

- 154 • An index case acquires infection (at time T_0), then after a short latent period becomes
155 infectious (at time T_1), and finally symptomatic (at time T_2), which is here defined as
156 “being eligible for testing”. Subsequently a proportion of all symptomatic subjects gets
157 tested and diagnosed (at time T_3). The time between T_2 and T_3 is called the “testing
158 delay” ($D_1 = T_3 - T_2$), and may vary between 0 and 5 days, and in this period individuals


159 might self-quarantine. We refer to the proportion of all symptomatically infected
160 subjects that is tested as testing coverage and vary it from 20% to 100%. After being
161 diagnosed, we assume index cases are quarantined with no further transmission.

- 162 • The second step is tracing contacts of the index, which occurs at time T_4 . A fraction of
163 those contacts will be quarantined, with effectiveness ranging from 0%-100%. For
164 simplicity we assume that contacts in quarantine do not spread. The time between T_3
165 and T_4 is the “tracing delay” ($D_2 = T_4 - T_3$), which may range from 0 (for instance with app
166 technology) to 4 days (with conventional approaches). In this step, tracing coverage is
167 defined as the proportion of contacts detected, which either depends on the capacity of
168 conventional approaches (ranging from 40% to 80%) or on the fraction of the population
169 using suitable app technology for screening (ranging from 40% to 80%).

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Figure 1: Schematic of the contact tracing process and its time delays.



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Table 1: Time delays in the test and contact tracing process (see also Figure 1).

Time	Event	Comments	Model implementation
T₀	the time of infection of the index case	Not observed	Start of the latent period, which lasts 1-3 days.
T₁	Time the index case becomes infectious	Proportion of pre-symptomatic transmission may range from 0% to 40% of all transmissions	After 1-3 days after infection, the infectious stage starts, which lasts 10 days with variable infectiousness. About 40% of transmission takes place in the first 2 days of infectiousness ²⁵ .
T₂	Time that the index (case) becomes	T ₀ until T ₂ reflects the time window in which prevention is not possible with CTS	The incubation period in the model is taken in agreement with published literature ²¹ .

	symptomatic, and eligible for testing		
T₃	Time that index (case) is tested positive	<p>T₂ until T₃ is the testing delay, which may range from 0-5 days</p> <p>The proportion being tested varies from 0-100%</p> <p>During this period we expect subjects to self-quarantine, with effectiveness ranging from 0%-100%</p>	After a testing delay D ₁ after symptom onset, an individual receives a positive test result and gets isolated. If an individual self isolates immediately, D ₁ =0. After isolation, no transmission takes place.
T₄	Time that contacts of index case are traced and quarantined.	<p>T₃ until T₄ is the tracing delay, which may range from 0 (for instance with app technology) to 4 days (with current GGD approach).</p> <p>Here we can also vary the proportion with short post-test-delay (those with apps) and not.</p>	<p>After a tracing delay D₂, contacts of the index case are traced and isolated. D₂ and the tracing coverage (proportion of contacts found and isolated) may differ between close and casual contacts. If household contact self-isolate immediately with the index case, it means that D₂=0 and coverage 100% for close contacts.</p> <p>For simplicity we assume that contacts in quarantine do not spread.</p>

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180 The best-case scenario is that all eligible for testing are immediately tested (coverage 100%)
181 with a very fast test result (test-delay 1 day), followed by immediate tracing (trace delay 0
182 days) of all contacts (coverage 100%), that immediately adhere to quarantine measures. More
183 realistic scenarios include testing and tracing delays, with suboptimal testing and tracing
184 coverages and suboptimal adherence to quarantining and testing.

185

186 **Impact on effectiveness on population level**

187 To analyse the impact of these time delays on the effectiveness of contact tracing we use a
188 model first described in Kretzschmar et al¹⁹, which was recently adapted for SARS-CoV-2⁵.
189 The stochastic model describes an epidemic in its early phase as a branching process. Starting
190 from a small set of initially infected individuals, the model calculates the numbers of latently
191 infected persons, infectious persons, and persons that are diagnosed and isolated in time steps
192 of one day. Latent infection, infectivity during the infectious period, and daily contact rates
193 are quantified using distributions taken from published data.²⁰⁻²⁴ We distinguish between
194 close contacts (e.g. household contacts, but also other high-risk contacts) and casual contacts,
195 which differ in the risk of acquiring infection from the index case. Also, the time required for
196 tracing and quarantining contacts and the coverage of tracing may differ between these types
197 of contacts and between different CTS (i.e., conventional contact tracing versus mobile app
198 supported contact tracing). Intervention effectiveness is determined by the daily probability
199 of an index case being diagnosed by testing during the infectious period, and depends on
200 various delays in the process of tracing household and non-household contacts, respectively,
201 and on the proportions of contacts that can be traced and isolated (see Figure 1). We assume
202 that isolation is perfect, i.e. that isolated persons do not transmit any longer. The model is
203 described by a set of difference equations, and allows for explicit computation of the basic
204 reproduction number R_0 , the effective reproduction number under social-distancing

205 interventions R_e and the effective reproduction number with CTS (R_{cts}). The model was
206 coded in Mathematica 12.1.

207

208 **Parameter settings**

209 We assumed that without social distancing individuals have on average 4 close contacts per
210 day and around 9 casual contacts per day, with certain stochastic variability. The distributions
211 were fitted to data from the Polymod study²³. Transmission probability per contact for close
212 contacts was taken to be 4 times higher than for casual contacts. Symptomatic and
213 asymptomatic cases were assumed to be equally infectious. Overall, the transmission
214 probability was calibrated to a basic reproduction number of $R_0 = 2.5$. For the social
215 distancing, we assumed that close contacts were reduced by 40% and casual contacts by 70%.
216 The resulting effective reproduction number was $R_e = 1.2$. Without further interventions, the
217 doubling time of the epidemic would be around 19 days.

218

219 **Scenarios modelled**

220 We analyzed the impact of various testing and tracing delays and tracing coverage on the
221 effective reproduction number R_{cts} while keeping the testing coverage at 100%. For
222 comparison, we also considered the strategy where symptomatic individuals get tested and
223 isolated, without subsequent tracing (R_{iso}). We varied the testing delay D_1 between 0 and 7
224 days, the tracing delay D_2 between 0 and 3 days, and tracing coverages between 0% and
225 100%. Tracing delays and coverages were allowed to differ between close contacts and
226 casual contacts.

227

228 We then compared the effectiveness of conventional CTS with a scenario that reflects mobile
229 app technology for alerting subjects to be tested and for tracing contacts. Differences between

230 these strategies were taken as follows. The testing delay (D_1) is reduced with app
231 technology. With conventional CTS symptomatic individuals need to decide to seek health
232 care to get tested, and we assume that with app technology symptomatic subjects get alerted
233 and can be tested without health care interference, for instance in specific test facilities for
234 app users. For conventional CTS we assume suboptimal coverage in identifying contacts
235 from the week before diagnosis by testing due to recall bias, especially for casual contacts.
236 For CTS with mobile app technology we assume 100% tracing coverage of the proportion of
237 subjects using app technology. For simplicity we assume 100% compliance with
238 quarantining. We assume that tracing goes back for 7 days before the positive test result. The
239 exact parameter values for this comparison are shown in Table 2.

240

241 Next, we quantified the impact of coverage of testing and app use on the effectiveness of
242 CTS. We varied the percentage of app users in the population between 20% and 80%. We
243 first considered the situation that testing is provided for 100% of persons with symptoms
244 independent of app use, and app use only influences the fraction of contacts that are traced.
245 Alternatively, we considered the situation that only app users with symptoms are tested (i.e.
246 testing coverage varies between 20% and 80%) and coverage of tracing also depends on
247 fraction of app use, i.e. varies as the testing coverage.

248

249 Finally, we quantified the fraction of transmissions of an index person that can be prevented,
250 and the contribution to the fraction prevented from isolation and from tracing contacts with
251 decreasing delays. The number of onward transmissions of an index case is by definition
252 described by the effective reproduction number of the realized scenario. Therefore, the
253 difference of reproduction numbers between two intervention scenarios under the condition
254 that an index case is diagnosed, will describe the fraction of onward transmissions prevented.

255 For contact persons, this is the fraction of the total infectivity that lies after the time of
 256 isolation, i.e. the part of infectiousness that is prevented by contact tracing. In other words, a
 257 contact person who is detected and isolated before the start of his infectious period is a fully
 258 prevented transmission, while a contact person who is only traced and identified after 70% of
 259 his infectivity has passed, is counted as 0.3 of a prevented onward transmission.

260

261 **Table 2: Comparison Conventional CT and Mobile app CT**

262

	Conventional CT	Mobile app CT
Testing coverage	100%	100%
Time to (self)-isolation (D_1)	4 days	0 day
Time to trace close contacts (D_2)	3 days	0 day
Time to trace other contacts	3 days	0 day
Tracing coverage close contacts	80%	100%
Tracing coverage casual contacts	50%	100%
Time traced back	7 days	7 days

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
264 Results

265 In the best-case scenario, if all infectious persons that develop symptoms are tested and
 266 isolated within 1 day after symptom onset the effective reproduction number R_e will decline
 267 from 1.2 to $R_{iso} = 0.97$, without contact tracing (Figure 2). Contact tracing will further
 268 decrease the reproduction number to $R_{cts}=0.6$ in the best case. In the optimal scenario – a
 269 testing delay of 0 days and a tracing delay of 0 days and a tracing coverage of 100%, the
 270 additional reduction of R_{cts} is 50%. Yet, with a diagnosis delay of 3 days, tracing delay or
 271 tracing coverage should be at most 1 day or at least 80% to keep R_{cts} below 1. In these

272 scenarios the reduction of R_{cts} compared to the best-case scenario is 15% and 17%. With a
 273 testing delay of 4 days, even the most efficient contact tracing cannot reach R_{cts} values below
 274 1.

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 277

278 **Figure 2: Impact of contact tracing on the effective reproduction number depending on various**
 279 **delays and tracing coverages.** In these analyses, 100% of those who develop symptoms get tested.
 280 For comparison the reproduction number R_{iso} with only isolation of index cases without contact
 281 tracing is plotted (green). (A) Influence of varying tracing delay D_1 on the x-axis. The curves plotted
 282 in blue show varying tracing delays D_2 ; (B) Here the tracing coverage is varied in the curves plotted
 283 in blue, while there is assumed to be no delay in tracing the contacts.
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
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289 We assumed that conventional CTS has longer tracing delay and lower tracing coverage than
 290 CTS based on app technology which results in marked differences in R_{cts} for the whole range
 291 of testing delay (Figure 3). With conventional CTS, R_{cts} would remain above 1, if the testing
 292 delay exceeds 2 days, whereas contact tracing based on app technology could still keep R_{cts}
 293 below 1, as long as testing and tracing coverage would be at least 80%. If the testing delay
 294 reaches 5 days or more, app technology adds little effectiveness to conventional CTS or just
 295 isolating symptomatic cases.

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Figure 3: Comparison of a conventional and mobile app CTS. For parameter values, see table 2. We assumed that ascertainment is 100% for the conventional CTS and 100% and 80% for the mobile app CTS.




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314 The reductions of R_e (based on social distancing) achieved by isolation only, conventional
 315 CTS, and mobile app-based CTS is shown in figure 4. For isolation only and for conventional
 316 CTS we assumed a delay of 4 days between symptom onset and isolation of the index case.
 317 The relative reductions are independent of the level of R_e , as there is a linear relationship
 318 between the various reproduction numbers. Conventional CTS, even if applied for all
 319 infected subjects with symptoms is 45% less effective than mobile app-based CTS, due to
 320 longer tracing delays and lower tracing coverage.
 321
 322 The effectiveness of app-based technology declines with lower fractions of persons using it
 323 (Figure 5). Yet, it remains more effective than conventional contact tracing even with 20%

324 coverage, due to its inherent speed. In Figure 5a we assume that all symptomatic persons get
 325 tested, and then vary coverage of app use. In Figure 5b, we assume that only app users who
 326 develop symptoms get diagnosed, and that only app users get traced and isolated. Even with
 327 low coverage there is a reduction of R_e , due to fast tracing of a small part of the population.
 328 Depending on R_e , such an approach might be sufficient to reduce R_{cts} to levels below 1.

329
 330 In Figure 6, we quantified proportions of transmissions per index case that can be prevented
 331 depending on testing delay, as well as the contributions of isolation of index cases and tracing
 332 of contacts. In the best-case scenario (testing and tracing delay being 0 days) more than 80%
 333 of transmissions can be prevented if coverage of infected persons being tested is 100%.

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 337 **Figure 4: The reduction of the effective reproduction number for various CTS.** The reproduction
 338 number with CTS, R_{cts} , is shown as a percentage of the reproduction number where only social
 339 distancing is implemented (R_e). For the isolation scenario and conventional tracing scenario we
 340 assumed that there is a delay of 4 days between symptom onset and isolation of the index case.




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 347 **Figure 5: The impact of mobile app use on R_{cts} for varying levels of app use.** In (A), we assume
 348 that there is also testing of those who do not use the mobile app, so app use only is used for tracing
 349 contacts. In (B), only app users, who develop symptoms, are tested.

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
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
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(B)



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371 **Figure 6: The fraction of onward transmissions prevented by isolation of the index case and**
 372 **his/her infected contacts.** The fraction prevented by contact tracing increases with decreasing tracing
 373 delay.
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378 Discussion and conclusions

379 Using a mathematical model that describes the different steps of the CTS for COVID-19 we
380 have quantified the relevance of delays and coverage proportions for controlling transmission
381 of SARS-CoV-2. Based on these analyses we conclude that reducing the testing delay, i.e.
382 shortening the time between symptom onset and test positivity, is the most crucial step.
383 Reducing the tracing delay, i.e. shortening the time of contact tracing, may further enhance
384 the effectiveness of CTS. Yet this additional effect rapidly declines with increasing testing
385 delay. Naturally, the effectiveness of CTS increases when proportions of index subjects
386 detected and contacts traced increase as well. CTS has huge potential to control virus
387 transmission, and thus to alleviate other control measures, but only if all delays are
388 maximally reduced.

389

390 There are several obvious factors that can reduce the effectiveness of CTS, such as a large
391 proportion of infectious subjects that remain asymptomatic or are otherwise not ascertained
392 and a large proportion of contacts that cannot be traced. The latter implies that the potential
393 benefits of using app-based technology for contact tracing requires participation of a
394 substantial proportion of the population. Also, app use needs to continue over a long time
395 period, so required continued adherence of app users. Low proportions of participation do not
396 render CTS useless, however, because it could help to locally extinguish clusters before they
397 grow larger. Also, for this purpose, the timeliness and completeness of CTS in local
398 populations should be high to make it successful.

399

400 The strength of the approach is that it explicitly takes many details of the contact tracing
401 process into account, such that the key factors can be identified. A limitation of our approach
402 is that it does not take population age-structure into account, which may influence the

403 proportion of asymptomatic cases and the mobile app use coverage. Also, the willingness of
404 an index case or contact person to self-isolate may be different in different age groups. We
405 have also assumed homogeneous mixing of the population, and homogeneous distributed use
406 of app technology for the different coverage levels. Yet, clustering of non-users may have
407 consequences for overall effectiveness of CTS, similar to clustering of non-vaccinated
408 subjects. This is an important aspect to be addressed in subsequent work. The model also
409 ignores that some contacts of the index case may have symptoms before they are traced by
410 CTS. As these contacts may already self-isolate, this lowers the benefits of contact tracing.
411
412 Our finding of the crucial importance of the first step of CTS, establishing a diagnosis in
413 subjects with symptoms, has important consequences. It requires an infrastructure for testing,
414 that allows subjects with symptoms to be tested, preferably, within one day of symptom
415 onset. Studies have demonstrated that viral shedding in the respiratory tract is highest at the
416 start of symptoms²⁵, so early testing will also increase the sensitivity of this approach. To
417 further enhance effectiveness, as many infectious subjects need to be tested, which requires a
418 low threshold for testing. As the clinical symptoms of COVID-19 are mostly mild and
419 heterogeneous, many subjects should be eligible for testing, resulting in a large proportion of
420 subjects with negative test results. Future work should determine the optimal balance
421 between the proportion of test-negatives and the effectiveness of CTS. In our country, testing
422 of ambulatory subjects is coordinated by the public health services and general practitioners.
423 That infrastructure may introduce a considerable delay in testing. To optimize the
424 effectiveness of CTS a different infrastructure with direct access of symptomatic subjects to
425 testing facilities should be considered. Finally, laboratories should be prepared to deliver
426 high-throughput rapid testing.

427

428 Our findings also provide strong support to optimize contact tracing. In our country this is
429 now based on establishing a contact between public health officers and index patients,
430 followed by an interview after which contacts are traced. This procedure is labor intensive,
431 time consuming, prone to recall bias and usually takes several days. Optimizing this process
432 with app technology, or any other method achieving the same goal of minimizing tracing
433 delay, will be needed to establish optimal control of transmission. An important advantage of
434 app-based technology is the possibility of performing multiple step tracing, as not only the
435 first-line contacts can be traced, but also their (second-line) contacts and so on. Naturally, the
436 number of contacts than rapidly increases, which increases the number of both correctly and
437 unnecessarily quarantined subjects. Further work will focus on finding an optimal balance for
438 this aspect. In fact, our findings suggest that optimized CTS, with short delays and high
439 coverage for testing and tracing could reduce the reproduction number by 50%, which would
440 allow alleviation of most of the currently implemented control measures.

441

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